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I
The problem of religion and science is the most basic one feeing contem­
porary man. Once the thought was prevalent that religion would be overcome 
by the advance of science and would come sooner or later to its demise. Even 
now there are some who hold this view. However, if one is only slightly aware 
of the warp and woof of the thought development of the past one hundred 
years, he will probably know that such a simple view of the matter was 
already outmoded long ago. Above all, such an approach makes it impossible 
to understand man.
Science is not separate from those who engage in it. Moreover, the pursuit 
of science is only one aspect of human knowledge. For example, a scientist 
as a human being is confronted with “nothingness” like everyone else; doubt 
concerning the meaning of his own existence, as well as of the existence of all 
things, can arise within him. The dimension in which such a doubt arises, the 
dimension in which its answer may be possible, far transcends the realm of 
scientific pursuits. It is a dimension which opens up at the ground of human 
existence itself. Should one reply that all man’s efforts ultimately come to 
nothing, and that it cannot be otherwise, it would mean that all things, includ­
ing science, are fundamentally meaningless. Such is the answer of “pessimistic 
nihilism.” However this answer, like the aforementioned doubt, does not 
belong to science, but to the realm of philosophy and religion. And in that 
realm nihilism is but one possible answer. Rather, today it is precisely the
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conquest of such a pessimistic nihilism which is the greatest task feeing phi- 
sophy and religion.
As was mentioned above, even those who say that nothingness and the like 
have nothing to do with them, and that they are not worth consideration, will 
sooner or later be swallowed up by the very nothingness they so ignore. For 
nothingness is already present, menacing and unyielding, under their very 
feet. By avoiding nothingness they fell even deeper into its clutches. In the 
present day the problem thus includes an overturning of the view that religion 
will die with the advance of science, which by its very efforts to deny religion 
and to block the way of the religious quest has had the effect of inducing the 
question—i.e. the quest concerning the ultimate meaning of human life or 
man’s existence—in an even more acute form. And therein the problem of 
nihilism looms large. In this situation science itself has become, on a more 
fundamental plane, a part of the problem.
However, as was said above,2 modern science completely changed the old 
view of nature, and as a result, various forms of atheism arose and an indifference 
to religion in general was fomented, of which Sartre’s atheistic existentialism 
is one example.
2 Chapter One of Sbukyo to v>a Monika.
As regards all religions, but above all such a clearly defined theism as Christi­
anity, the fact that the characteristics of the natural world have completely 
changed cannot be without relevance to any view of God. Unless the problem 
of religion and science attains a level that is fundamental enough to render 
the view of God itself problematical, then we cannot say that the problem has 
really been faced. It is as profound and serious as that.
In the past the laws of the natural world were regarded as the order of God, 
and within them was recognized the providence of God. The order of the 
natural world and the order of the human world were unified into one great 
“cosmic” order, a concept which means, in brief, that all things in the universe 
exist and can exist only by each being given its proper and essentially desig­
nated place in the whole. This order was thought of as something teleological. 
From another point of view, it was thought to prove the existence of God.
In this sense the problem of “order” has traditionally been a major one, as 
much for religion as for philosophy. Augustine, for instance, says in his De 
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Ordinc, VII, 19, “On the other hand, if God is just—as we are taught, and as 
we feel by the inevitable fact of order itself—then He is just by giving to each 
thing its own.” In this, Augustine sees a “great order” and also recognizes 
“divine Providence.” The conception of the cosmic order may be traced back 
much earlier to Plato and Pythagoras as well as to the Upanishads, and even 
farther to various ancient peoples. Even in modem times, such natural scientists 
as Kepler and Newton thought regarding their own study that by coming to 
know the laws of nature they were delving into the secret of God’s cosmic 
economy.
As is well known, however, parallel with the establishment of natural science 
and the scientific world view, the conception of the natural world changed 
from a teleological to a mechanistic view, bringing with it a fundamental 
change in the relation between man and nature. This change was a process in 
which the view of the natural world became disengaged from the matrix of 
the religious world view. Especially symptomatic in this regard was the great 
Lisbon earthquake of 1755. Many of the English clergy, for instance, attributed 
its cause to the fact that the residents of that city were Catholic. The people of 
Lisbon themselves thought they had brought about the disaster by permitting 
heretics (Protestants) to reside in their city. But behind such controversies, 
the earthquake was a profound shock to the minds of many Europeans. The 
ill-feeling this event caused between Voltaire and Rousseau, and the treatise 
Kant wrote concerning the earthquake in 1756, belong to the chronicles of the 
history of philosophy. In his essay Kant attacked as blasphemous the notion 
that would view such a natural phenomenon as divine punishment, or would 
notice “a purpose of divine solicitude” therein, which he called a “mistaken, 
human teleology.”
Following all this, the natural world has come to bear more and more strongly 
the features of a world cold and dead, governed by laws of mechanical neces­
sity, completely indifferent to the fact of man. To be sure, it is a w'orld in 
which we are living, which is inseparably connected with our existence, but 
nevertheless a world in which we cannot live as “man”, which excludes (and 
obliterates) our “humor?’ mode of being. We can neither reject nor accept such 
a world. It is within such a paradoxical relation that the natural world has 
come to reveal itself to us.
As the man in Dostoevsky’s Notes from the Underground says, not being able 
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to deny such a world and not being able to acknowledge it, man has no other 
alternative than to dash his head against it. Such a world leads man to despair. 
Only, as can be seen again in Dostoevsky, from within that despair itself an 
awareness tfnibilum arises. This awareness of nibilum penetrates a depth which 
lies beneath the ground of the world scientifically viewed, with its natural 
laws and inhuman rationality; a depth where opens up a horizon which makes 
possible a freedom beyond all necessity and a life beyond all rationality—the 
horizon of “subterranean life”. For Dostoevsky, this awareness brought forth 
anew, together with the problem of nihilism, the problem of religion con­
fronting it. And he was of course not the only person who became aware of this 
same complex of problems emerging from the depths of his own existence.
Thus, at present within the natural world, which has become indifferent to 
and paradoxical for human existence, and within its scientific laws, there un­
folds a fundamental problem for all religions. Today a religion only based upon 
the old teleological view of nature is, at the least, inadequate. Again, however, 
is it after all possible to regard such an indifferent natural order as God’s order; 
an order that erases our “human” mode of being? Or is such an indifferent natu­
ral order altogether incompatible with the concept of God ? Whether compatible 
or incompatible, it cannot help but breed a major problem regarding the old 
concept of God as well as that of man. However, religion has not yet confronted 
science in this fundamental way.
In the past, most religions have been motivated rather exclusively by 
“human” concern; by man’s various concerns about the matter of man. 
Their basis was, to use Nietzsche’s words, “human, all too human.” But this 
is perhaps no wonder, since religion is concerned with man’s salvation. How­
ever, to be concerned with man’s salvation, and to think that the foundation 
on which that salvation is possible remains within the realm of “human” 
concerns, are two different matters.
Today, a world indifferent to human concerns becomes a problem for re­
ligion, namely as a problem concerning the foundation of religion. The problem 
is this: when the relation between an insentient world and man and the rela­
tion between such a world and God are made the foundation of religion, what 
does the relation of God and man—that is, religion—become?
So long as the world could be seen as teleological there was no great difficulty 
here. It meant that the world was seen as being in fundamental harmony with 
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the existence of man in the world. That is, man was seen as the highest re­
presentative of all the things in the world; the world was seen with man as its 
center, and the meaning and teles of the world was thought of with the meaning 
and telos of human existence as its criterion. Here, accordingly, in the relation 
between God and man, the God-man relation became the axis, and the world 
was merely assigned to its periphery. This remained fundamentally the same 
whether the world was thought of affirmatively as God’s creation or whether 
it was considered negatively as something to be repudiated. And from this view 
of the world, it became possible to think of the relation between God and man 
as having an exclusively human concern as its base and, then further, as some­
thing exclusively “personal”.
When, however, the world becomes an indifferent world and, as mentioned 
before, confronts man with the paradoxical relationship in which he can neither 
abandon it nor abide in it, there the world, instead of remaining peripheral 
with the God-man relation as its axis, cuts horizontally across the vertical God­
man axis, and becomes independent, a sort of horizontal axis in itself. In its 
relation to the human mode of being, the world came to take on the form of a 
paradoxical contradiction in place of a teleological harmony. At the same time, 
in its relation to God, the world could no longer simply be thought of as ordered 
according to divine providence or divine will. The world’s absolute imperson­
ality now appears as something qualitatively different from both human 
“personality” and divine “personality”. It comes to be something which 
severs the “personal” relation between God and man.
In this world man is not simply personal. He is simultaneously completely 
material and completely biological, controlled by indifferent natural laws. The 
natural laws dominate the existence of every thing, whether non-living, 
living, or human. They dominate them with indifference, that is, without 
regard for the differences just mentioned, and, in particular, without regard for 
human interests.
For example, when a dog springs up and catches a piece of bread that has 
been thrown to it in mid-air, the movement of the man’s arm, the motion of 
the thrown bread, and the action of the dog are all subject to the laws of nature. 
Whether atomic power kills millions or whether it is used for peaceful objectives, 
the natural laws at work display the same cold inhumanity, indifferent to human 
interests. Yet those laws govern the existence of everything, man as well.
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Religions until now have emphasized exclusively the aspect of life. “Soul” 
has been seen only from the aspect of life; “personality” and “spirit” also have 
been understood with life as the basis. But life from the beginning is one with 
death. All living things can, just as they are, be seen from the aspect of death.
In Buddhism, perhaps in Christianity at its early stages as well, there is a 
method of meditation called the “death-skull contemplation”. A death-skull 
lying in a heath of pampas grass has been frequently depicted by Japanese 
artists. For instance, Basho, the great haiku poet, has a haiku with the following 
preface, “In the house of Honma Shume there hangs on the wall of his Nob 
stage a painting portraying a Nob scene with a group of skeletons with flutes 
and hand-drums. Indeed, can the face of life be any different from this play? 
The ancient tale of using a death-skull for a pillow and being unable, fatally, to 
distinguish dream from reality also wants to illustrate our life.” The haiku is 
this:
Lightning flashes— 
Close by my face
The pampas grass!
The poet, in one of his wandering tours, one day was obliged to pass the 
night in a wild field, when lightning flashed and instantly he saw himself lying 
on a grass field and saw some pampas grass close by his face. Here, no doubt, 
the Buddhistic “skull contemplation” and the traditional topic in art form the 
background of this haiku. But what is new here is that a living man sees himself, 
as he is, in the image of the skull in the pampas grass. This poem thus does not 
simply refer to a skull in the pampas grass. There is a Zen saying, “Dead skulls 
all over the field.” This field is, for example, the Ginza or Broadway. The time 
will of course come when they will become fields of pampas.
“... one of his disciples saith unto him, Master, behold, what man­
ner of stones and what manner of buildings! And Jesus said unto 
him, Seest thou these great buildings? there shall not be left here one 
stone upon another, which shall not be thrown down.”
Mark 13:2
But there is no need for buildings to actually crumble and turn into fields of 
pampas grass. One can see the Ginza just as it is in all its magnificence as a field 
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of pampas grass. It can be seen as a photograph with double exposure. In fact, 
such a double exposure is the real image. True reality is twofold. In a hundred 
years not one of the people, young or old, male or female, now walking the 
Ginza will still be alive. But, as is said, “one thought-instant is 10,000 years; 
10,000 years is one thought-instant.” Seen in the lightning flash at such a 
thought-instant, in the light of such a “mental eye,” the actuality of a hundred 
years hence is already an actuality today. Thus one can see in a double exposure 
the living, just as they are, healthy and walking, as dead. “Lightning flashes—/ 
Close by my face/ The pampas grass’.” is also a poem about the Ginza.
This kind of double vision can be found as well among modem Western poets. 
T. S. Eliot has written:
Unreal city
Under the brown fog of a winter dawn
A crowd flowed over London Bridge, so many, 
I had not thought death had undone so many.
He took the last line, which describes the procession of the dead in Dante’s 
Inferno, as a description of the people “flowing over” London Bridge. For him 
the actual London before his eyes appeared as “unreal,” that is, as dead. (In the 
latter part of “The Wasteland” not only London but Jerusalem, Athens, and 
Alexandria, the centers of the development of Western culture, are called 
unreal. The double-viewing eye is directed into history as well.)
Such a double exposure is the true view of reality. Reality itself requires it. 
Here spirit, personality, life, and matter are all seen together. They are not 
separate. The same reality can be seen from various tomographic sections: 
spirit, personality, life, and matter. Each tomographic section possesses reality. 
But the root-reality is just that which is seen as the whole of all the sections 
superimposed. It is not that only one of the sections is true and all the others 
reduced to it. Reality is not to be seen through such a reduction. The aspect of 
life and the aspect of death are both equally real. Reality is that which appears 
as life and as death. It is life, it is death, and at the same time, in itself, is not life, 
and not death. It is to be called the non-duality of life and death. How this 
reality is to be considered is a problem for later consideration. At present it 
may simply be said that the sectional cut which reveals the death aspect of re­
ality is what has heretofore been termed “life” by religions. In such religions 
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soul, personality, spirit and the like have been seen exclusively from this aspect 
of life. The same applies even to God.
From ancient times calamities, both natural and man-made, were often 
said to be divine punishment or the wrath of God. The destruction of Israel 
was viewed by the Prophets as the whip of God’s wrath upon a people who had 
turned against Him. The sacking of Rome by Alaric was regarded by Roman 
Christians and Non-Christians alike to be a divine punishment, each attribut­
ing the responsibility to the faith of the other. These examples show that the 
order of nature and history had come to be considered teleologically from the 
perspective of the personality of God, and that the relation between God and 
man had come to be understood mainly as a “human” concern. But the laws 
of the natural world, while they dominate both life and matter and govern our 
life as well as our death, are in themselves indifferent to our life and death, our 
fortune and misfortune, our good and evil. Nature possesses an indifference 
which ignores the differences of good and evil, of fortune and misfortune, which 
are matters for “human” concern. Such insentience is felt cold and unfeeling 
by man, and sometimes the utmost cruelty.
If such laws of nature were attributed to God as the order created by Him, 
then God would come to include along with and in contrast to his personality 
just such a cold indifference. Or is it that the laws of nature do not belong to 
God? If they do not, then God would cease to be absolute and thus cease to 
be God. How, then, is this problem to be dealt with? Basically, it demands a 
re-examination of the concept of “personality” as hitherto applied both to 
God and to man.
The question of religion and science, however, besides the problem of the 
modem scientific view of nature versus the traditional religious (especially 
Christian) views, includes still another problem. This is the problem of modem 
man’s awareness of his own subjectivity. These two problems are, in fact, 
interrelated. Therefore, we must make at least some reference to this problem of 
the awareness of subjectivity.
n
Since the advent of modem times, the world view of natural science has been 
linked with the problem of atheism. The rejection of the existence of a personal 
God has sprung up as a conclusion to the rejection of the teleological view of 
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the world. That atheism was generally the standpoint of scientific rationalism, 
and in its contents it boiled down to materialism. Its spirit was “progress.”
The aspect of materialism in this atheism was related to the question of the 
essence of the things of the world. It took that essence to be matter. Its other 
aspect, the aspect of scientific rationalism, gave expression to the power of 
human reason to control such a materialistic world. This rationalism was no 
longer the earlier standpoint of metaphysical reason which assumed its own 
root to lie in the divine order of the Creator and which obeyed that order. The 
new rationalism expressed the standpoint of human reason which emerged to 
break up the frame of a divine order. The fact that the world was seen as materi­
alistic and mechanistic meant that the world order had lost the meaning it had 
in the teleological world view, that is, of having derived from God’s “personal” 
will. The new world-image showed every sign ofbeing unrelated to the person­
ality of God. From the other side, this means that the world simultaneously came 
to be seen as completely controllable by human reason. For within the materi­
alistic world view there is the implication that the world is absolutely passive 
material subject to human control. Considered conversely, through the view 
that all things of the world are essentially reducible to matter, man who controls 
such a world came to the awareness of his own reason as something absolutely 
active and absolutely free. Human reason became transferred to a field in which 
it seemed to be all-mighty. In this field, reason no longer had the chance—nor 
the necessity—to view itself as something within a divine order or subordinate 
to God’s will.
Thus, from the composite unity of a world which had become absolutely 
passive and material on one hand and of human reason which had become 
absolutely active and formative on the other, the idea of progress emerged. 
Reason can realize itself freely and wholeheartedly in a completely passive 
world and can give that world a rational formation. Indeed, this is the way 
reason has to function. The future then opens up as a road of unlimited progress. 
This was the optimism attained by modem atheism, that is, the atheism in 
form of the so-called “enlightenment” of human reason.
This atheism was, therefore, a composite of three elements: materialism, 
scientific rationalism, and the idea of progress. But what is manifest in this is 
the awakening of man in his entirely free and independent subjectivity. The 
so-called “progressive” atheism in this way became established as the unity of
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man’s awakening to subjectivity in his reason and the materialistic world view. 
In the denial of God’s existence, these two aspects were linked together.
At present, however, atheism has advanced one step further. Conscious of 
the meaninglessness of the world which is now solely materialistic and mecha­
nistic, it became aware of the nibilum concealed at the bottom of the world. 
Further, for present day man, only when he comes to an awareness of nibilum 
within himself as the subjective ground of his existence beyond even reason, 
and only when he treads on that nibilum^ is it truly possible for him, so he thinks, 
to speak ofsubjectivity. This is because to set foot on nibilum is to break through 
at one stroke the dimension of ene of things, the dimension of which all things 
are thought to exist in the world objectively. It opens up the standpoint of man 
as subject which can by no means be reduced to an objective existence. Thus, 
as mentioned above, there can be seen in contemporary nihilism its own sub­
jectivization.
If we characterize this atheism by comparing it with Christianity, the nibilum 
brought to our consciousness as underlying all things and the world itself has 
its counterpart in the nibilum that appeared in the Christian conception of 
God’s creation as ex mbila”. And man’s subjectivity in which he be­
comes aware of his self by deciding to depend on no thing, and thus positing 
his existence on nibilum—that is, the standpoint of the subjectivization of ni­
bilum—is analogous to God’s Being as an absolute subject that was revealed, 
for instance, when He called Himself “I am that I am.” In the case of the aware­
ness of nothingness in contemporary atheism, the “nibilum” in “creatio ex nibiti” 
becomes, by virtue of the fact that the existence of God is negated and nothing­
ness is seen in the place of God, an abyss, and this abyss comes to be revealed 
at the foundation of the world and of oneself.
Thus, with the abyssal negativity implied in contemporary atheism occurs 
the consummation of the subjective awakening which modem atheism has 
invited from the beginning. This is clear in the case of Nietzsche. Sartre as 
well, as has already been mentioned, belongs to this development. In both of 
them atheism is linked with existentialism. This means that atheism has been 
subjectivized and nibilum has become the field of the so-called ekstasis of man’s 
self-being, the dimension of transcendence opening up in the direction not of 
God but of nibilum. It will be obvious that such an atheism no longer believes 
in the idea of “progress’ of the earlier atheism and can not be simply optimistic.
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On the contrary, the features that characterize the atheism of present day 
existentialism are the consciousness of the most fundamental human crisis, the 
suffering which is one with existence itself, and the passionate decision by 
which man, firmly upholding the independence of his self-being where there is 
nothing to be dependent upon, tries to be thoroughly himself and thereby 
break through the fundamental crisis of human existence.
Of course, as regards both atheism and existence, Nietzsche’s position is by 
far broader, deeper, and more severe than Sartre’s. Sartre’s existentialism will 
confine itself in the frame of humanism by assigning an absolute affirmation to 
man instead of to God. But atheism is essentially not a problem that concerns 
human existence alone. It also concerns the existence of all things, that is, the 
world. Atheism should mean a radical turnabout in the way of looking at the 
world too. To borrow Nietzsche’s image, it implies a catastrophic change similar 
to that event in natural history when dry land rose out of the sea and various 
animals that formerly lived in the sea had to transmute into land dwellers, and 
thus had to change radically their way of living, their way of looking at things, 
and all their habits, undergoing a fundamental reorientation in their existence 
and evaluation. The consequence of atheism will be like the entire land sinking 
into the sea and the land animals all changing into sea animals, a change so 
fundamental that not only man’s mode of existence but also the look of the 
world must change radically. There, for example, individual things lose their 
substantiality on the plane of nihilum which is their ground and come to be 
seen like the ocean’s waves. In the world as it appeared in Nietzsche’s vision, 
in the world of “eternal return”, things take such an outlook. And with that, 
a fundamental turnabout is also demanded in man’s mode of existence; a turna­
bout which, moreover, appears in Nietzsche as the intention towards a new 
religiosity—fundamentally different from previous religions, but nevertheless, 
a new religiosity—symbolized by the name Dionysius.
Although we speak of atheism or of a “godless man” (so-called in Thus Spake 
Zarathustra'), it is fundamentally different from ancient atheism or from the 
ordinary atheist. In the same way, although Nietzsche emphasized the “un­
human” way of being, he did not advocate an un-humanity on the same plane 
as the humanity usually spoken of. His is rather the attempt to establish a new 
way of being human on the place where the frame of “the human” has been 
broken through. It attempts to posit a new form of man’s being from the other 
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side of anthropocentric existence, from “beyond good and evil.” This is the 
meaning of Nietzsche’s saying, “Man is something to be overcome.” The new 
form is symbolized by the term Obermemcb. However fanciful his thought might 
appear at first glance, it may be said to have been the result of the attempt to 
pursue thoroughly the basic changes in the form of man’s being as well as in 
the look of the world, both of which are implied in atheism.
Sartre as well says that his existentialism is the attempt to pursue the con­
sequences of atheism. But Sartre understands man throughout on the dimension 
of consciousness. Further, in this connection, while considering that human 
existence takes its rise in nothingness, as regards the world and all things in it, 
he still has not dropped the way of viewing them on the dimension of con­
sciousness. The fact that his pursuit of the consequences of atheism has not 
been undertaken thoroughly makes itself clear in his view that existentialism 
is humanism. It is primarily in Nietzsche that atheism came to its truly thor­
ough subjectivization, that nothingness came to possess a transcendental 
character by becoming the place of the “ckstasii? of self-existence, and that 
man’s freedom and independence came to a thoroughgoing confrontation with 
his being essentially dependent on God.
In Kierkegaard, as is well known, the resolution of this same confrontation 
is sought in the direction of faith. In his case, existentialism, the emphasis on 
subjectivity, is the placing of man in a field of decision in which he must choose 
between these two possibilities: either he has his existence established and 
maintained on the foundation of God’s salvation, or, without that salvation, 
in the despair of the so-called “sickness unto death,” he falls into an unauthentic 
existence. In the latter case, he is led to assume delusively that the existence of 
the self which wants to be itself without being based on God is the real ex­
istence. He thus calls forth nothingness at the base of his self-being which 
is now involved in eternal damnation.
Thus, in Nietzsche and Kierkegaard the existentialistic attitude has a 
fundamentally religious significance, so far as it has to do with a confrontation 
between man’s subjectivity and God, and with them, in that confrontation, 
existentialism has become split into atheistic and theistic directions. But 
whereas Nietzsche, in the development of his thought, has passed through 
the purgative fires of the mechanistic world view in order to enter into a con­
frontation with the new way of human being which lies hidden in the establish­
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ment of the natural sciences, there is no such radical confrontation to be found 
in Kierkegaard. Consequently, nothingness in Kierkegaard does not yet mean 
the abyss where man’s self-being comes to its “ecstatic” transcendence, although 
the germ of this idea can be found in The Concept of Dread. In its relation to the 
problem of religion and science his standpoint remains insufficient.
m
It has been stated in the first section that the laws of nature in the modem 
scientific concept of nature become so completely indifferent to man and his 
concerns, that the world controlled by them appears as something transversing 
the personal relation between God and man which obtained in the religious 
experience of former ages. The world now has the characteristic of being es­
sentially unrelated to God and man in so far as they are personal entities, or 
rather, the characteristic of being essentially incompatible with the idea of 
“personality”. Therefore, I suggested that the idea of “personality” entertained 
in the past as regards both God and man now requires reexamination.
I then spoke in the second section of the awareness of subjectivity in modem 
man which is intertwined with the problem of the modem scientific view of 
nature. I said that in our time this awareness comes to its consummation as the 
subjectivization of atheism. That is, nibilum, which signifies the death of God, 
emerges from beneath the ground of the material, mechanical world and is 
realized by modem man as an abyss in which he reaches the “ecstatic” tran­
scendence of his own self-being. Only when a man has such an abyss opened at 
the base of his existence does his subjectivity become subjectivity in the 
word’s true sense. He becomes aware of himself as truly free and independent.
Historically, it is in Christianity that these problems have generated. It has 
been at once the matrix and the antagonist of modem science since its origin in 
the Renaissance or even before. It is the same with modem atheism, the various 
forms of which are unthinkable apart from Christianity. Behind the ideas com­
prising the ingredients of modem atheism—for example, the idea of the natural 
law with unyielding necessity, the idea of progress, the idea of social justice 
which has become the motivating factor in so many social revolutions—lies a 
genealogy which leads back to Christianity. It is well known that Nietzsche 
derived his radical attack on Christianity from an attitude of mind that was 
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nurtured within Christianity, that is, to constantly and uncompromisingly 
pursue truthfulness. Let us, therefore, first consider our problem in connection 
with Christianity.
To preface this investigation, I should like to begin with a famous passage 
from Matthew.
“Ye have heard that it hath been said, Thou shalt love thy neighbor, 
and hate thine enemy.
But I say unto you, Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, 
and do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despite- 
fully use you, and persecute you. That ye may be the children of your 
Father which is in heaven: for he maketh his sun to rise on the evil 
and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust.
For if ye love them which love you, what reward have ye? do not 
even the publicans the same?
And if ye salute your brethren only, what do ye more than others? 
do not even the publicans so?
Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is 
perfect.”
In this passage there are two points to be noted. The first is the command to 
love one’s enemies as one’s friends. This is said to be the way in which one 
comes to acquire the same perfection as God. In Buddhism this is called “non­
differentiating love beyond enemy and friend.” Second, God causing the sun 
to rise on the evil as well as the good and causing the rain to fall on the unjust 
as well as the just is cited as an example of this perfection. What is being spoken 
of here is a phenomenon similar to what I before called the indifference of nature. 
However, this is not a cold and insensate indifference, but the indifference of 
love, an indifference which, as love-equality, transcends the human distinctions 
of good and evil, just and unjust.
The indifference of nature is one which reduces all to the most abstract entity 
common to them all—whether considered as “matter” or as some particular 
physical element. In contrast to this, the indifference of love is an indifference 
which embraces all things in their most concrete form—for example, good men 
and evil men, embracing the differences just as they are.
But what is this non-differentiating love (or agape) which loves the enemy as 
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well? In a word, it is “making oneself empty.” This meant, in the case of Christ, 
taking the form of man and becoming, moreover, a servant—and this in ac­
cordance with the will of God. The origin of His “making himself empty” 
(ekkwm) is in God. It is God’s love which is willing to forgive even the sinner 
who has gone against Him. This forgiving-love is the expression of the “perfec­
tion” of God who embraces equally the good and the evil. Therefore it may be 
said that also within God Himself is included the meaning of “having made 
himself empty.” However, in the case of the Son ekkeiwis is actualized in the 
fact that He who was in the beginning with God and was God takes the form 
of a servant. In the case of the Father ekkendsis is included already in God’s 
original perfection. That is to say, in the very fact itself of God’s being God there 
is essentially included the characteristic of “having made Himself empty.” 
In the case of the Son Christ, this characteristic is a work which has been ful­
filled; in the case of the Father, it is His original nature. If the case of the Son is 
called ekkendsis, the case of the Father is kenfris. In Buddhist terminology it is 
anatman or muga, that is, non-ego or selflessness.3
3 The similar concept of “emptiness” implied in Buddhism is what is called tuny ata. 
&unyata\s> the original nature of Eternal Buddha, of Buddha as Buddha eternally is in acrn. It 
is an unchanging state of perfection of Eternal Buddha, which at all times is found already 
fulfilled, always in the modus of “present perfect”, so to speak. In traditional Buddhistic 
terminology, funyata is the Dharma of Buddha, the most original and authentic way of 
Buddha-being. And as such, it is simultaneously the ground of the tambboga-baya (the 
“reward-body”), that is, of the way of Buddha-being in its self-manifestation as the com­
passionate Tatbagata (Thus-Come). This compassion is a compassion grounded in “Empti­
ness.” It is the so-called Great Compassion. “Emptiness” takes on here the character and 
meaning of anatman or muga, of non-ego or selflessness. Moreover, this Emptiness identical 
with the Great Compassion is the ground of the mrmana-kaya (the “transformation-body”) 
of the Buddha, that is, of the way of Buddha-being in its manifestation in the form of man 
as the Tatbagata Shakamuni. Buddha, being originally “empty” and “formless”, takes the 
form of the Thus-Come, whether the simple form of Buddha as in the &us£fogd-body, or 
the double form of man-Buddha, and thus is revealed. This means essentially an tkktnorir 
(making oneself empty) though it seems at first glance to be the contrary. The transition 
from being “formless” to being in form means selflessness and compassion, as in the case of a 
school-master playing with his children. In any case, all through the basic thought of Bud- 
dhology, expecially in the Mahayana, the concepts of emptiness, compassion and selfless­
ness are seen to be inseparably connected. The Buddhistic way of living as well as the way 
of thinking are permeated with tenons and ebtenosis. Tatbagata is thought to mean “Thus-*
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To hate the enemy and love one’s friend is a characteristically human position. 
It is the position of the ego. In this sense, the indifference of love can also be 
said to be “non-ego”. Essentially implied in the perfection of God is the char­
acteristic of selflessness.
To become equal to this perfection of God, to be perfect as the Father in 
Heaven is perfect, to “become the son of the Father who is in Heaven” must, 
for man, be actualized by loving one’s enemy. Man must negate differentiating 
human love and turn to non-diflerentiating divine love. He must negate eras 
and live in agape, negate the self and exist in selflessness. “Making oneself 
empty” is for Him who is in the form of God to become a servant in the form 
of man. This Christ-love is the embodiment of God’s perfection. For a Christian, 
“making oneself empty” means changing from human, differentiating love to 
divine, non-differentiating love. This Christian love may be said to imitate or 
be patterned after the perfection of God.
Although God’s perfection may be understood in its characteristic of selfless 
love of making Himself empty, that perfection denotes the “mode of being 
‘perfect’,” rather than the work of “making oneself empty,” which is spoken 
of in the case of Christ and is demanded of man—the work of “loving.” In 
other words, within God’s perfection, as I said above,4 there is essentially in­
cluded the characteristic of having made Himself empty. The work of love thus 
comes into being as the imitation or the embodiment of that perfection. Con­
sidered in its relation to love as work or deed, God’s perfection can also be called 
love. But if the work of love has a personal characteristic (as I think it does), 
then it must be thought that God’s perfection (and love as perfection) is an 
even more fundamental thing than being a “personal” entity, and that it is 
as the imitation or embodiment of this perfection that the “personal” for the 
first time comes into being.
*Gone” as well as “Thus-Come”. The reason is easy to understand, as being manifest is here 
inseparable from being hidden, being formless from being in form, emptiness from compas­
sion. Rather, taking form means a self-determination and self-determination means nega­
tion (or self-negation). Compassion means a self-negation, that is, “making oneself empty”, 
which is a manifestation of the original “Emptiness”. Thus-Come means always Thus- 
Gone.
4 See Chapter One.
In this sense, within God’s perfection is included a characteristic to be
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spoken of as a kind of trans-personality or impersonality—not an impersonality 
which is in simple contradistinction to personality, but as mentioned above,5 
a personal impersonality. This characteristic of personal impersonality can 
also be suggested in the non-differentiating love which causes the sun to rise 
on the evil and good alike, and which causes the rain to fall on both the unright­
eous and righteous.
5 Chapter One.
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Again, in Holy Scripture it is said that Heaven is the residence of God and 
earth the stool at His feet. Before,5 in relation to God’s omnipresence and om­
nipotence, I spoke of personal impersonality. Here, as well, I think it possible 
to consider His impersonality to be that which precedes (or is above) the simply 
personal, that from which personality itself derives.
I said before that the non-differentiating love which causes the sun to rise 
equally on the evil and good, on the enemy as well as the friend, has a charac­
teristic of selflessness. Selflessness (aw/wai), needless to say, is the basic posi­
tion ofBuddhism, in which it is called the Great Wisdom and the Great Compas­
sion (mdha-prajna and maba-Juruna). I have already had occasion to touch upon 
maba-prajna, somewhat5 Maba-karuna, or the Great Compassion Heart, is pre­
cisely like the fact of there being no private sunrise. The sun does not choose 
the place upon which to send its rays, nor does it have any preference guided 
by likes or dislikes. There is no “ego” in its illumination. To be without ego 
or selfless is thus to be “empty” (YiirjwrJ). In this, God’s “perfectness” has 
something in common with the Great Compassionate Heart of Buddhism. 
And such a way of being perfect like God is something which is demanded of 
men.
From what has been said above, it can be seen that this “perfectness” of 
God is quite different, for example, from the “personal” absoluteness of the 
God who chose the people of Israel—the God who commands with absolute 
will and power, who loves the righteous and punishes the sinful. If selflessness, 
which does not choose, is perfection, then a personality which chooses is never 
“perfection”. Here, two different ways of viewing the God of the Bible are 
seen. In the past, Christianity has generally given attention only to the per­
sonality aspect of God. Instances in which attention was directed to the “im­
personal” aspect have been few.
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We take up this problem here in accordance with the aforementioned problem 
of religion and science; whether nature as understood by modem natural science 
can, in spite of its insentience and indifference to human good and evil, fortune 
and misfortune, still be thought of as belonging to God. Further, the modem 
view of nature as insentient is, as was mentioned before, connected with the 
problem of man’s freedom and independence, and the awakening of his subjec­
tivity. It is because today this composite problem cannot be denied that we 
make a question of the “personal” conception of God and ask about the trans­
personal aspect included in the concept of God.
I do not think an idea of God able to cope with this problem is to be found 
ready-made within the history of Christian dogmatics.
It is only recently that modem science’s view of nature has become a trenchant 
problem for religion. I do not see that during this period, Christianity has pro­
duced any thought which is capable of coming in deep enough contact with 
this problem and confronting it genuinely. It is only regarding the problems of 
man’s freedom and independence and the awakening of his subjectivity, that 
attempts to open up the aspect of the trans-personal in God with the intention 
of penetrating this problem thoroughly have not been completely lacking. 
These are the attempts which belong to the tradition of negative theology.
If we start from the problem of religion and science, the problem of man’s 
freedom and independence seems to be only indirectly related. But as previously 
indicated, these are really two aspects of the same problem. Therefore, I should 
like to begin by taking up these attempts of negative theology first as regards 
the problem of man’s freedom and independence.
(To be continued)
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